Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin - School of Business and Economics

Curriculum Vitae

Research Interests

Working Papers

• Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz (2022): Dynamic Screening with Verifiable Bankruptcy Dynamic Screening with Verifiable Bankruptcy
  
  Online Appendix
• Martin Pollrich, Roland Strausz (2022): Irrelevance of Fee Structures in Quality Certification Irrelevance of Fee Structures in Quality Certification
  
  Online Appendix
• Dongsoo Shin, Roland Strausz (2022): Insourcing Vs Outsourcing in Vertical Structure Insourcing Vs Outsourcing in Vertical Structure
  
  Online Appendix
• Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Roland Strausz (2021): Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence
  video-presentation (20min)
  NEW: video-presentation (90min)
  
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2017): Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information
  
  Online Appendix

Publications

• Roland Strausz (2022): Correlation-Savvy SellersCorrelation-Savvy Sellers, forthcoming RAND Journal of Economics,
  video-presentation
  
  DOI: 
  Online Appendix
• Volker Nocke, Roland Strausz (2022): Collective Brand ReputationCollective Brand Reputation, forthcoming Journal of Political Economy,
  video-presentation
  DOI: 10.1086/720986
  Online Appendix
• Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz (2022): Optimal Non-Linear Pricing with Data-Sensitive ConsumersOptimal Non-Linear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers, forthcoming American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
  video-presentation
  
  DOI: 
  Online Appendix
• Gorkem Celik, Dongsoo Shin, Roland Strausz (2022): Aggregate Information and Organizational StructuresAggregate Information and Organizational Structures, forthcoming Journal of Industrial Economics,
  video-presentation
  
  DOI: 
  Online Appendix
• Gorkem Celik, Dongsoo Shin, Roland Strausz (2021): Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative ProviderPublic Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider, The RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 52, pp. 314-333
  
  DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12370
  Online Appendix
• Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz (2017): Sequential versus Static Screening – An Equivalence ResultSequential versus Static Screening – An Equivalence Result, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 106, pp. 317-328
  
  DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.015
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2017): Politically Induced Regulatory Risk and Independent Regulatory AgenciesPolitically Induced Regulatory Risk and Independent Regulatory Agencies, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 54, pp. 215-238
  
  DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.07.003
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2017): A Theory of Crowdfunding: Crowdfunding, demand uncertainty, and moral hazard - a mechanism design approachA Theory of Crowdfunding: Crowdfunding, demand uncertainty, and moral hazard - a mechanism design approach, American Economic Review, Volume 107 (6), pp. 1430–1476
  
  DOI: 10.1257/aer.20151700
  Online Appendix
• Konrad Stahl, Roland Strausz (2017): Certification and Market TransparencyCertification and Market Transparency, Review of Economic Studies, Volume 84(4), pp. 1842-1868
  
  DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdw064
  Online Appendix
• Fabio Antoniou, Roland Strausz (2017): Feed-in Subsidies, Taxation, and Inefficient EntryFeed-in Subsidies, Taxation, and Inefficient Entry, Environmental and Resource Economics, Volume 67, pp. 925-940
  
  DOI: 10.1007/s10640-016-0012-8
  Online Appendix
• Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz (2016): Optimality of sequential screening with multiple units and ex post participation constraintsOptimality of sequential screening with multiple units and ex post participation constraints, Economics Letters, Volume 142, pp. 64–68
  
  DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.010
  Online Appendix
• Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz (2015): Ex post information rents in sequential screeningEx post information rents in sequential screening, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 90, pp. 257-273
  
  DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.003
  Online Appendix
• Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz (2015): Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal RightsOptimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights, Review of Economic Studies, Volume 82, pp. 762-790
  
  DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdv003
  Online Appendix
• Robert Schmidt, Roland Strausz (2015): On the Timing of Climate AgreementsOn the Timing of Climate Agreements, Environmental and Resource Economics, Volume 62, pp. 521-547
  
  DOI: 10.1007/s10640-014-9828-2
  Online Appendix
• Raffaele Fiocco, Roland Strausz (2015): Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic RegulationConsumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Volume 24, pp. 550–569
  
  DOI: 10.1111/jems.12104/
  Online Appendix
• Dongsoo Shin, Roland Strausz (2014): Delegation and Dynamic IncentivesDelegation and Dynamic Incentives, RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 45, pp. 495-520
  
  DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12059
  Online Appendix
• Lydia Mechtenberg, Roland Strausz  (2012): Migration of the Talented: Can Europe catch up with the U.S.?Migration of the Talented: Can Europe catch up with the U.S.?, Journal of Public Economic Theory , Volume 14, pp. 945–969
  
  DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12005
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2012): Mediated Contracts and Mechanism DesignMediated Contracts and Mechanism Design, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 147 (3), pp. 1280-1290
  
  DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.005
  Online Appendix
• Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz (2011): Comments to “Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents”Comments to “Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents”, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 146, pp. 2159-2164
  
  DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.005
  Online Appendix
• Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz (2011): Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre–Project PlanningOptimal Procurement Contracts with Pre–Project Planning, Review of Economic Studies, Volume 78, pp. 1015-1041
  
  DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdq033
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2011): Regulatory Risk under Optimal Incentive RegulationRegulatory Risk under Optimal Incentive Regulation, Economic Journal, Volume 121, pp. 740–762
  
  DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02441.x
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2009): Monopoly Distortions in Durability and Multi-Dimensional QualityMonopoly Distortions in Durability and Multi-Dimensional Quality, Economics Letters, Volume 105,pp. 333-335
  
  DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.09.009
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2009): Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency CostsEntrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Volume 18, pp. 845–870
  
  DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00231.x
  Online Appendix
• Katrin Burkhardt, Roland Strausz (2009): Accounting Transparency and the Asset Substitution ProblemAccounting Transparency and the Asset Substitution Problem, The Accounting Review, Volume 84 (3), pp. 689-713
  
  DOI: 10.2308/accr.2009.84.3.689
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2009): Planned Obsolescence as an Incentive Device for Unobservable QualityPlanned Obsolescence as an Incentive Device for Unobservable Quality, Economic Journal, Volume 119, pp. 1405-1421
  
  DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02290.x
  Online Appendix
• Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz (2008): Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic ScreeningEx Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening, B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 8:1 (Topics), Article 25
  
  DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1458
  Online Appendix
• Lydia Mechtenberg, Roland Strausz  (2008): The Bologna Process: How student mobility affects multi-cultural skills and educational qualityThe Bologna Process: How student mobility affects multi-cultural skills and educational quality, International Tax and Public Finance, Volume 15, pp. 109-130
  
  DOI: 10.1007/s10797-007-9040-1
  Online Appendix
• Helmut Bester, Roland Strausz (2007): Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy CommunicationContracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 136, pp. 236-259
  
  DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.009
  Online Appendix
• Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz (2007): VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalitiesVCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities, Economics Letters, Volume 94, pp. 192-196
  
  DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.028
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2007): Regulating Availability with Demand UncertaintyRegulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty, German Economic Review, Volume 8, pp. 107-121
  
  DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2007.00136.x
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2006): Interim Information in Long Term ContractsInterim Information in Long Term Contracts, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Volume 15, pp. 1041-1067
  
  DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00127.x
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2006): Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in OrganizationsBuried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Volume 60, pp. 460-470
  
  DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.10.004
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2006): Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms Principal-Agent ModelsDeterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms Principal-Agent Models, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 128, pp. 306-314
  
  DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.008
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2006): Ordinary Shares and ManagersOrdinary Shares and Managers, Journal of Economics, Volume 87, pp. 1-14
  
  DOI: 10.1007/s00712-005-0170-6
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2006): Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing , Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Volume 59, pp. 89-107
  
  DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.03.013
  Online Appendix
• Kay Mitusch, Roland Strausz (2005): Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited CommitmentMediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Volume 21, pp.  467-500
  
  DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewi018
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2005): Honest Certification and the Threat of CaptureHonest Certification and the Threat of Capture, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 23, pp. 45-62
  
  DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.09.002
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2004): Comment on Internalization of Knowledge Spillovers in R&D Joint VenturesComment on Internalization of Knowledge Spillovers in R&D Joint Ventures, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Volume 160, pp. 75-78
  
  DOI: 10.1628/093245604773861113
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2003): Deterministic Mechanisms and the Revelation PrincipleDeterministic Mechanisms and the Revelation Principle, Economics Letters, Volume 79, pp. 333-37
  
  DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00037-5
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2001): Mitigating Non-Contractibility with Interim RandomizationMitigating Non-Contractibility with Interim Randomization, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Volume 157, pp. 231-245
  
  DOI: 10.1628/0932456013623132
  Online Appendix
• Helmut Bester, Roland Strausz (2001): Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent CaseContracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case, Econometrica, Volume 69, pp. 1077-1098
  
  DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00231
  Online Appendix
• Helmut Bester, Roland Strausz (2000): Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Multi-Agent CaseImperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Multi-Agent Case, Economics Letters, Volume 69, pp. 165-17
  
  DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00301-3
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (2000): Regulation in a Political Economy: An explanation of limited commitment of governments in the context of the ratchet effectRegulation in a Political Economy: An explanation of limited commitment of governments in the context of the ratchet effect, Economics of Governance, Volume 1, 181-197
  
  DOI: 10.1007/PL00011013
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (1999): Efficiency in Sequential PartnershipsEfficiency in Sequential Partnerships, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 85, pp. 140-156
  
  DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2496
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (1997): Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent RelationshipCollusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Volume 99, pp. 497-518
  Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2040
  DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00078
  Online Appendix
• Roland Strausz (1997): Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal Agent RelationshipDelegation of Monitoring in a Principal Agent Relationship, Review of Economic Studies, Volume 64, pp. 337-357
  
  DOI: 10.2307/2971717
  Online Appendix